A new pattern of world commerce is becoming clearer—as are its costs
When America?took a protectionist turn two years ago, it provoked dark warnings about the miseries of the 1930s. Today those ominous predictions look misplaced. Yes, China is slowing. And, yes, Western firms exposed to China, such as Apple, have been clobbered. But global growth in 2018 was decent, unemployment fell and profits rose. In November President Donald Trump signed a trade pact with Mexico and Canada. If talks over the next month lead to a deal with Xi Jinping, markets will conclude that the trade war is political theatre designed to squeeze a few concessions from China, not blow up commerce.
Such complacency is mistaken. Today’s trade tensions are compounding a shift that has been under way since the financial crisis of 2008-09. Cross-border investment, trade, bank loans and supply chains have all been shrinking or stagnating relative to world?gdp?(see Briefing). Globalisation has given way to a new era of sluggishness. Adapting a term coined by a Dutch writer, we call it “slowbalisation”.
The golden age of globalisation, in 1990-2010, was something to behold. Commerce soared as the cost of shifting goods in ships and planes fell, phone calls got cheaper, tariffs were cut and finance liberalised. Business went gangbusters, as firms set up around the world, investors roamed and consumers shopped in supermarkets with enough choice to impress Phileas Fogg.
Globalisation has slowed from light speed to a snail’s pace in the past decade for several reasons. The cost of moving goods has stopped falling. Multinational firms have found that global sprawl burns money and that local rivals often eat them alive. Activity is shifting towards services, which are harder to sell across borders: scissors can be exported in 20ft-containers, but hair stylists cannot. And Chinese manufacturing has become more self-reliant, so needs to import fewer parts.
This is the fragile backdrop to Mr Trump’s trade war. Tariffs tend to get the most attention. If America ratchets up duties on China in March, as threatened, the average tariff rate on American imports will rise to 3.4%, its highest for 40 years. (Most firms plan to pass the cost on to customers.) Less glaring, but just as pernicious, is that rules of commerce are being rewritten around the world. The principle that investors and firms should be?treated equally regardless of their ?is being ditched.
Evidence for this is everywhere. Geopolitical rivalry is gripping the tech industry, which accounts for about 20% of world stockmarkets. Rules on privacy, data and espionage are splintering. Tax systems are being bent to patriotic ends—in America to prod firms to repatriate capital, in Europe to target Silicon Valley. America and the European Union have new regimes for vetting foreign investment, while China, despite its bluster, has no in- tention of giving foreign firms a level playing-field. America has weaponised the power it gets from running the world’s dollar- payments system, to punish foreigners such as Huawei (see Business section). Even humdrum areas such as accounting and?antitrust are fragmenting.
第一段
When America?took a protectionist turn two years ago, it provoked dark warnings about the miseries of the 1930s. Today those ominous predictions look misplaced. Yes, China is slowing. And, yes, Western firms exposed to China, such as Apple, have been clobbered. But global growth in 2018 was decent, unemployment fell and profits rose. In November President Donald Trump signed a trade pact with Mexico and Canada. If talks over the next month lead to a deal with Xi Jinping, markets will conclude that the trade war is political theatre designed to squeeze a few concessions from China, not blow up commerce.
【新詞習得】
【實用詞組&翻譯】
第二段
Such complacency is mistaken. Today’s trade tensions are compounding a shift that has been under way since the financial crisis of 2008-09. Cross-border investment, trade, bank loans and supply chains have all been shrinking or stagnating relative to world GDP?(see Briefing). Globalisation has given way to a new era of sluggishness. Adapting a term coined by a Dutch writer, we call it “slowbalisation”.
【新詞習得】
【實用詞組&翻譯】
第三段
The golden age of globalisation, in 1990-2010, was something to behold. Commerce soared as the cost of shifting goods in ships and planes fell, phone calls got cheaper, tariffs were cut and finance liberalised. Business went gangbusters, as firms set up around the world, investors roamed and consumers shopped in supermarkets with enough choice to impress Phileas Fogg.
【新詞習得】
第四段
Globalisation has slowed from light speed to a snail’s pace in the past decade for several reasons. The cost of moving goods has stopped falling. Multinational firms have found that global sprawl burns money and that local rivals often eat them alive. Activity is shifting towards services, which are harder to sell across borders: scissors can be exported in 20ft-containers, but hair stylists cannot. And Chinese manufacturing has become more self-reliant, so needs to import fewer parts.
【新詞習得】
【實用詞組&翻譯】
第五段
This is the fragile backdrop to Mr Trump’s trade war. Tariffs tend to get the most attention. If America ratchets up duties on China in March, as threatened, the average tariff rate on American imports will rise to 3.4%, its highest for 40 years. (Most firms plan to pass the cost on to customers.) Less glaring, but just as pernicious, is that rules of commerce are being rewritten around the world. The principle that investors and firms should be?treated equally regardless of their ?is being ditched.
【新詞習得】
【實用詞組&翻譯】
第六段
Evidence for this is everywhere. Geopolitical rivalry is gripping the tech industry, which accounts for about 20% of world stockmarkets. Rules on privacy, data and espionage are splintering. Tax systems are being bent to patriotic ends—in America to prod firms to repatriate capital, in Europe to target Silicon Valley. America and the European Union have new regimes for vetting foreign investment, while China, despite its bluster, has no intention of giving foreign firms a level playing-field. America has weaponised the power it gets from running the world’s dollar-payments system, to punish foreigners such as Huawei (see Business section). Even humdrum areas such as accounting and?antitrust are fragmenting.
【新詞習得】
1.geopolitical[,d?iop?'lit?kl]:adj. 地理政治學的
2.rivalry['ra?vlri]:n.競爭;對抗
3.espionage['?sp??nɑ?]:n. 間諜;間諜活動;刺探
4.splinter['spl?nt?]:n. 碎片;微小的東西;極瘦的人v. 分裂;裂成碎片
5.bend to:屈從于
6.patriotic[?pe?tr??ɑt?k]:adj.愛國的 patriotic ends 處于愛國的目的
7.prod[prɑd]:n.刺針 v.刺;捅
8.repatriate[,ri'petr?et]:v.遣返 repatriate capital 調資回國
9.regime [re'?im]:n.政權,政體;社會制度;管理體制
10.vetting:n.審查
11.bluster ['bl?st?]:v.咆哮;氣勢洶洶的說 n.怒號;恫嚇
12.humdrum ['h?mdr?m]:adj.v.n.單調;乏味
13.antitrust [,?nt?'tr?st]:adj.反壟斷的
14.fragment['fr?ɡm?nt]:v.碎片化
【實用詞組&翻譯】

? 2026. All Rights Reserved. 滬ICP備2023009024號-1